The paper examines the behavior of "evolutionary" models with -noise like those which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. The paper is built around two main observations: that the "long run stochastic stability" of a convention is related to the speed with which evolution toward and away from the convention occurs, and that evolution is more rapid (and hence more powerful) when it may proceed via a series of small steps between intermediate steady states. The formal analysis uses two new measures, the radius and modified coradius, to characterize the long run stochastically stable set of an evolutionary model and to bound the speed with which evolutionary change occurs. Though not universally powerful, the result can be used to make many previous analyses more transparent and extends them by providing 
Introduction
To explore whether some outcomes might be regarded as more reasonable than others in games with multiple equilibria Foster and Young (1990) , Kandori, Mailath and Rob (KMR) (1993) and Young (1993a) proposed examining the process by which conventions might become established using "evolutionary" models with persistent randomness. While any outcome can occur in any period in such models, one can explore equilibrium selection by asking whether some outcomes are much more likely than others. Specifically, an outcome is referred to as a "long run equilibrium" or as being "stochastically stable" if the long run probability with which it occurs does not vanish as the amount of noise goes to zero. 1 A striking observation of the aforementioned papers is that this seemingly weak criterion not only rules out unstable mixed equilibria, but also selects a unique outcome (the "risk-dominant" equilibrium) in© This paper provides a general analysis of the behavior of evolutionary models with persistent randomness in an attempt to clarify and extend our understanding of this literature. Intuitively, if a social convention tends to persist for a long time after it is established and is sufficently attractive in the sense of being likely to emerge relatively soon after play begins in any other state, then in the long run that convention will prevail most of the time. This paper builds an algorithm for identifying long run stochastically stable sets around this observation by providing measures of the speed with which evolution will occur. The "step-by-step evolution" idea, which turns out to be crucial to the development, is that evolution in a given direction tends to be more rapid (and hence more powerful) when it may proceed via a sequence of smaller steps (rather than requiring sudden large changes). The main theorem of the paper is a sufficient condition for identifiying the long run stochastically stable set of a model that (when it applies) also provides an upper bound on the speed with which evolution occurs. Surprisingly, the fairly simple intuitive calculation turns out to be sufficiently powerful as to account for what is happening in most models that have been previously analyzed. A number of new applications are also discussed, including a result generalizing the selection of risk-dominant equilibria in ¥ games to the selection of -dominant equilibria in arbitrary games, an analysis of a two dimensional local interaction model and an example illustrating the potential long run stochastic stability of cycles.
Analytically, existing papers on the evolution of conventions tend to be fairly similar in that the main result is usually an identification of the long run stochastically stable set of a model using the tree construction algorithm developed by Foster and Young (1990) , KMR, Young (1993a) and Kandori and Rob (1995) . While this algorithm has been tremendously useful, its implementation can be difficult (particularly when working with complex models) and it has a couple of other drawbacks. First, it is inherently limited in scope to a characterization of the very long run limit.
This can be problematic because evolution in these models is at times so slow as to be of limited practical importance. 3 Second, the algorithm is sufficiently complex as to have made the whole literature seem a bit mysterious -a commonly expressed frustration is the feeling that the typical paper writes down a model, says something about trees and after several pages of calculations gives an answer without letting one see how the answer is connected to the assumptions of the model.
To think generally about what is going on in the existing literature, this paper considers a simple (albeit abstract) reduced form framework in which the primitives of the model are a set of possible "states" of the population and a family of transition probabilities on this state space indexed by a noise level (as opposed to a set of players, the game they are playing, their behavior rules, etc.). The goal is not to have a universally applicable characterization of long run stochastic stability, but instead to have a characterization that is intuitive and that (when it applies) provides a description of both long run and medium run behavior.
To make the paper easier to follow the main theorem is presented in two steps. Section 3 contains a simplified version of the theorem based on a mutation counting argument. The radius of the basin of attraction of a limit set (or a union of limit sets) ,
, is defined as the minimum number of "mutations" (' -probability events) necessary to escape the basin of attraction of , formalizes the observation that large evolutionary changes will occur more rapidly if it is possible for the change to be effected via a series of more gradual steps between nearly stable states. A biological analogy may be useful in trying to think about why this should be the case. Think of how a mouse might evolve into a bat. If the process of growing a wing required ten distinct independent genetic mutations and a creature with anything less than a full wing was not viable, we would have to wait a very, very long time until one mouse happened to have all ten mutations simultaneously. If instead a creature with only one mutation was able to survive equally well (or had an advantage, say, because a flap of skin on its arms helped it keep cool), and a second mutation at any subsequent date produced another viable species, and so on, then evolution might take place in a reasonable period of time.
Reflecting the increased speed of step-by-step evolution, the modified coradius measure is computed by subtracting from the coradius a correction term which depends on the number of is also a sufficient condition for the long run stochastically stable set to be contained in d
. While I expect that readers will find it intuitive that some accounting for the speed of step-by-step evolution should allow one to develop a more powerful theorem than that of Section 3, what may be surprising is that the fairly simple theorem of Section 4 appears to be sufficiently powerful so as to allow virtually all of the identifications of long run stochastically stable sets found in the previous literature to be rederived as corollaries (albeit sometimes with a great deal of work.) Evidently, behind most of the mysterious tree constructions in the literature, all that is happening is that the models contain a nearly stable state (or a set of such states) which requires a large number of mutations to escape (and hence is persistent) and to which the system returns relatively quickly after starting at any other point (either because it can be reached with few mutations or by a sequence of smaller steps through intermediate limit sets).
Several examples are used to illustrate the application of the theorem. While it is sometimes necessary to use the modified coradius (as opposed to the simple coradius) even in situations which are as uncomplicated as the KMR model with best response dynamics and a e R f ¥ g game, the technique appears to be most useful when analyzing complex models where the unperturbed dynamics contain a large number of limit sets. The most noteworthy application is a demonstration that h i
-dominant equilibria are again selected in a two dimensional local interaction model and that evolution in this model is relatively rapid even though the model lacks the "contagion" dynamics of one dimensional local interaction models.
The final section of the paper is concerned with its relationship to the literature. In discussing the applicability of the theorem I attempt to catalog both the extent to which the results of previous papers could have been derived as applications of the main theorem (in which case the primary benefit is that it provides a convergence rate) and the extent to which the main theorem also allows results on long run behavior to be derived more easily. Using the former criterion the theorem is very widely applicable; the latter situation is not as common. An alternate proof of the long run stochastic stablility part of the main theorem based on a Freidlin-Wentzell "tree surgery" argument is also given and helps illustrate how the paper builds on the techniques of Young (1993a), Kandori and Rob (1995) , Ellison (1993) , Evans (1993) , Samuelson (1994) , and others.
Model and Definitions

The Model
The typical paper on the evolution of conventions writes down an explicit model in which a large finite population of players are randomly matched to play some game j , makes some assumptions about what the players observe and how they usually react to their observations, and then adds some source of noise like having each player tremble with some probability in each period. There is, however, a great deal of variation in the precise specification of each of these elements. To obtain a framework which can encompass all of these variants, what I do here is to abstract away from the population game story and focus instead on the dynamic model which is derived from it. Bergin and Lipman (1996) ), correlated mutations which occur among groups of players, or the impossibility of some mutations (in which case the cost is set to infinity).
Descriptions of the behavior in the medium and long run
For any fixed E , the Markov process corresponding to the model with -noise has an unique invariant distribution
) which can be thought of as giving the probability of observing each of the states after evolution has been going on for a long, long time. . This is a tradeoff which has been made to simplify notation, and if one ever had a reason to analyze a model with such transition probabilities it would not be difficult to extend the main theorem to do so. 5 The assumptions on the nature of the perturbations we have made are sufficient to ensure that the limit does in fact exist. To see this note that for any two states Â and Ã Lemma 3.1 of Chapter 6 of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) expresses the quantity ÄÅ AE Ç È É as a ratio of polynomials in the transition probabilities. Because the transition probabilities themselves are asymptotically proportional to powers of Ê , each of these ratios will have a limit as 
A simple radius-coradius theorem
This section defines two new concepts, the radius and coradius of the basin of attraction of a limit set, and uses them to provide a simple characterization of the long run and medium run behavior of some evolutionary models with noise. counts which reflect the size of the basin of attraction of a limit set.
The radius and coradius (and other definitions)
The measure of persistence which appears in both versions of the main theorem of this paper is what I call the radius of a basin of attraction. Suppose
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is the base Markov process of a model of evolution with noise, and let P be a union of one or more of its limit sets. 
Define the radius of the basin of attraction of´, µ ) ¶· ḩ , to be the minimum cost of any path from
Note that if we define set-to-set cost functions by 
The cost functions have this form because the dynamics consist of first applying the unperturbed dynamics and then adding "mutations" (under which a transition from a state to a state has a probability which is asymptotically proportional to ) to the state which results. 4 7
, and that
The second property of a union of limit sets Ó which will play a critical role in both theorems is the length of time necessary to reach the basin of attraction of Ô from any other state. A simple way to put a (not particularly tight) bound on this waiting time is to count the "number of mutations" which are required to reach Õ . Formally, the coradius of the basin of attraction of
It simplifies the calculation of the coradius to keep in mind that the maximum in the formula above is always achieved at a state which belongs to a limit set. Also, because it is always possible to get from any element of to at zero cost, the coradius is equivalently defined by
The theorem
The first theorem of this paper is a sufficient condition for identifying the long run stochastically stable set of a model. When the condition is satisfied we have also an upper bound on the rate at which convergence to that set occurs. follows from the fact that long run stochastically stable set is always contained in the union of a model's limit sets.
Examples
I now present a couple of easy applications of the theorem intended mostly to illustrate the use of the radius-coradius theorem and to provide some geometric intuition applicable to uniform matching models where noise takes the form of independent random trembles. The game on the left below is that which Young (1993a) first used to show that risk dominant equilibria need not be selected in Such an interpretation has been encouraged by Young's (1993a) proof that in weakly acyclic games all long run stochastically stable states involve players playing a Nash equilbrium and by the reasonableness of the selection in a variety of settings. 10 However, the example points out that beyond the class of weakly acyclic games the selected outcome may instead be a cycle in which players play actions which do not occur in any equilibrium. In the example,
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large and the first result follows from Theorem 1. Formalizing this argument requires only a straightforward but tedious accounting for integer problems (and if desired for players not including their own play in the distribution to which they play a best response).
The result for the game on the right is also straightforward given the structure of the best response regions once one gets used to looking at the radius and coradius of limit sets which are not singletons. The deterministic cycle where the population goes from everyone playing ² in one period to everyone playing ³ in the next and back is a limit set. The radius of the basin of
, and the result follows by symmetry.
The bound on the convergence rate in these games provided by the theorem is that the expected waits until reaching the long run stochastically stable set is at most of order de g fhijkl and mn p oqrstu . There is nothing particularly interesting about this result, other than that as is typical in models with uniform matching the convergence time is rapidly increasing in the population size.
In the game on the right, one might be tempted to view the selection of the cycle as a curiosity attributable to an unreasonable specification of the deterministic dynamics. If I had instead chosen an unperturbed dynamic in which play changed more gradually or where players had a longer memory, for example, the cycle would not be a limit set. While the example may not be robust, the problem is fundamental. A variety of learning and evolutionary models have cycles as limit sets. The limit set which is selected by models with noise is determined by the sizes of and relations between the basins of attraction, and there is no reason to think that limit sets corresponding to equilibria will have the largest basins of attraction.
An application: generalizing risk dominance to v w -dominance
In x P y V z games, the models of KMR and Young (1993a) provide an elegant and robust characterization of the long run impact of mutations on the development of social conventions -societies are led to adopt the risk-dominant equilibrium. In this section the radius-coradius theorem is used to derive a generalization of this result.
To derive the result it is necessary to specify a KMR-style model in a bit more detail. Suppose Ellison (1993) further demonstrates the robustness of this selection by showing that risk-dominant equilibria are also selected in a local interaction model involving ò -nearest neighbor matching on a circle with best-reply dynamics.
Darwinian dynamic one looks at, and Ellison (1993) 
and Theorem 1 applies.
QED.
I hope that the fact that the proof of the Corollary is fairly trivial will be taken as evidence that the main theorem of the paper can facilitate the development of general results. Because I realize that one might be tempted to conclude instead that the result itself is trivial, I would like to note that both Kandori and Rob's (1995) Step-by-step evolution and an improved theorem
In this section a more powerful theorem is obtained by deriving a tighter bound on the time required for evolution toward a limit set to occur. The construction of the new bound, using a measure I call the modified coradius, follows a consideration of the extent to which large evolutionary changes will occur more quickly when they can be achieved by passing through a number of 14 Note that what show is that risk dominant equilibria are selected in games satisfying both the total bandwagon property and the monotone share property. Evidently, the latter restriction is unnecessary. 15 The appropriate definition for his model being that an equilibrium gh I ih I ipppih q 
is not included in the sum.) The definition of modified cost can be extended to a point-to-set concept by setting
The modified coradius of the basin of attraction of Î is then defined by 
!
. The graph on the left reflects a situation in which an animal with any one or two of these mutations could not survive. In this case, getting the large mutation we need seems very unlikely. In the situation on the right, each single mutation on its own provides an increase in fitness which allows that mutation to take over the population. The large cumulative change from " to # seems more plausible when such gradual change is possible. 
The main theorem
The following theorem strengthens the result of the previous section by using the modified coradius as the measure of persistence. In practice, this extension seems to greatly enhance the result's applicability. The second and sixth lemmas in the appendix contain these two results.
Theorem 2 Let be a model of evolution with noise, and suppose that for
It is also worth noting that it follows from the second and third lemmas that the radius provides a precise measure of the epsilon-order of the time necessary to leave the basin of attraction of 
QED.
In contrast with the now standard techniques developed by Foster and Young (1990) , KMR, Young (1993a) , and Kandori and Rob (1995) the main theorem of this paper is not universally applicable. Why then might one wish to use the theorem of this paper? 16 First, and most concretely, the theorem provides a bound on the convergence rate as well as a long run limit.
Second, the theorem provides intuition for why the long run stochastically stable set of a model is what it is. (In this respect readers may also be surprised to find that in most previous papers
all that is going on behind the tree construction is that there is a single limit set, or collection thereof, which is persistent and relatively attractive.) Finally, because a direct application of the standard tree construction algorithm requires that one identify all of the limit sets of a model and compute the cost of moving between them, it is difficult both to develop theorems which apply to broad classes of models (which contain members where the number of limit sets and the relations between them differ) and simply to analyze complex models with large numbers of steady states.
It is in these situations that the radius-modified coradius theorem may be easier to apply. 17
Examples
I now present a few simple examples which illustrate the use of the radius-modified coradius theorem and some of its limitations. I begin with an example which again provides geometric intuition for uniform matching models. 16 See section 6 for a discussion of the theorem's applicability. 17 In section 6.3 it is shown that whenever Theorem 2 applies to a single limit set~the long run stochastically stable set could have been found by applying "tree surgery" arguments in a fairly systematic way. The claim that application may be "easier"might thus be interpreted alternately as saying that the theorem systematizes the use of tree surgery arguments. 
Example 2 Consider a model in
is only about
È É Ê
because this is the modified cost of the path
and the modified cost of the indirect path
. The result thus follows from Theorem 2. The three-state Markov process whose dynamics are represented in the figure on the right above is intended to illustrate how (unlike the Freidlin-Wentzell characterization), a direct application of the main theorem sometimes fails to identify the long run stochastically stable set. While the example has an unique long run stochastically stable state, if we compute the radius and modified coradius of each of the limit sets we don't find it -
, and
. That the theorem fails to identify the long run stochastically stable set here is not a result of the modified coradius bound not being tight (the bounds are tight). Rather, the persistence-attractiveness description just doesn't capture fully what is going on as the system moves between limit sets.
This last example also provides a nice opportunity to point out a feature of the theorem which has not been emphasized so far -that the « in the theorem can be a union of limit sets rather than a single limit set. This feature is certainly practically important because in models involving extensive form games, e.g. Samuelson (1993, 1997) and Huck and Oechssler (1995) , the set of long run stochastically stable set has often been found to be to be a union of several limit sets between which the system moves when single mutations occur. In addition this feature may at times be exploited to expand the theorem's power. In the example note
, and that It is not clear to me how useful the possibility of making arguments like this will be in practice.
Local interaction: two dimensional lattices and fast vs. slow evolution
Evolutionary models with local interaction are intended to capture social situations in which players interact most often with a small stable set of friends, colleagues, or neighbors. Ellison (1993) argued that such models are interesting not only because such relationships exist in the real world, but also because it is only in the context of such models that convergence is fast enough to make evolutionary selection plausible. In this section I show that õ ö -dominant equilibria are selected and evolution is fast in particular models with one and two dimensional local interaction
structures. The latter model should be of interest both because it clarifies the role of "contagion" dynamics in producing fast evolution and as an illustration of where and how the radius-modified coradius theorem is most useful.
A one-dimensional model
Suppose first as in Ellison (1993) 
and again Theorem 1 applies.
QED.
Evolution in this model may be regarded as "fast" in that the Ö -exponent of the waiting time does not increase in the size of the population. The way in which evolution toward × typically occurs is that a small cluster of players playing Ø arises randomly, and playing Ù then spreads contagiously as players at the edge of the cluster choose to join in.
A two-dimensional model
Consider now a local interaction model in which players are situated at the vertices of a twodimensional lattice and interact with their four nearest neighbors. 19 The best response dynamics of such a model are quite different from those of the one-dimensional model. Small clusters of players playing a Ú Û -dominant equilibrium need not grow contagiously, and there may be many heterogeneous steady states. The main result of this subsection is that coordinating on Ü Ý -dominant equilibria is nonetheless still selected and that evolution remains fast.
To specify the model formally, suppose that Þ D ß à n á players are located at the vertices of an
lattice on the surface of a torus and are repeatedly matched to play a finite symmetric game ç with strategy set è . Let a state é ¥ ê » ë of the system be a function
interpreted as being the action taken by the player at location © . Let the unperturbed dynamics on be generated by assuming that in each period each player plays a deterministic best response to the strategies used by his four immediate neighbors in the previous period, i.e. with probability one is followed by a state ! which satisfies
is the distribution putting probability
, and 3 p
. Again take the perturbed process to be that which incorporates independent -probability mutations. 
Corollary 3
. Further, as each "mutation" can only break up one row and one column, we know that
. Applying this relationship repeatedly, it follows that if To complete the proof it now suffices to show that 2 2 a
. To do so, I explicitly 
had one of them playing f .
Repeating this process, we eventually obtain a path of modified cost at most three to a limit set in which all players in the first two rows play g . Following the same process of adding single mutations to the existing cluster, but now working on the first two columns, we obtain a path of modified cost at most three to a state in which all players in the first two columns also play h . By the result above on "crosses", such a state is in the basin of attraction of i p
.
QED.
The two-dimensional local interaction model may have many limit sets. explicitly construct a minimum order tree on the set of limit sets, it is precisely the kind of situation where the modified coradius is most useful.
What happens in the dynamics of the model is that rather than growing contagiously, small clusters of players playing the risk-dominant equilibrium grow by agglomeration as mutations at the edge of the clusters cause new players to join them. Fast evolution, however, is not so much about the contagious spread of strategies as it is about the ability of stategies to gain footholds in small areas. While not as fast as a contagion, the step-by-step agglomerative growth after a cluster forms does not add significantly to the overall length of the evolutionary process.
Relationships with the literature
One of the primary motivations for this paper was a desire to develop a framework which would provide a more thorough understanding of the behavior of evolutionary models with noise. It may thus be useful to discuss in some detail the relationship between this paper and the existing literature. In this section I discuss the extent to which the main theorem of this paper is applicable to models which have been previously studied, how the techniques of this paper build on previous work, and an alternate "tree surgery" proof of part of the main theorem.
Applications
The question of where the framework is applicable can be interpreted in two very different ways:
asking for which models in the literature the long run stochastically stable set could have been identified using the main theorem of this paper, or alternatively asking where the theorem further makes the identification of the long run stochastically stable set easier (or more general) than it would have been with the standard techniques.
The first interpretation is relevant when one wants to know when the radius-modified coradius theorem can be used to add convergence rates to existing characterizations or when it could have been used to identify the long run stochastically stable set in the first place. With this interpretation, the theorem turns out to be applicable to almost every model for which the long run stochastically stable set has previously been identified. 20 For example, this includes all of the cases where the long run stochastically stable set is identified in Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Ellison (1993) , Evans (1993) , Samuelson (1993, 1997) , Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) , Samuelson (1994) and Young (1993a, b). 21 Cases where the theorem is not applicable include both models which do not fit into the framework of this paper and models which do fit but for which the theorem lacks power. Examples of the first type include models where the noise is sufficiently restricted so as to render the model 20 One should keep in mind here that this definition of applicability allows me to include many models where the easiest way to see that the the main theorem of this paper applies involves essentially constructing the minimum order Freidlin-Wentzell tree and reading the radius and modified coradius off of the tree diagram. 21 Most of these papers, in fact, require only a w theorem. Young (1993b) and the e d s f game in Young (1993a) are examples where the modified coradius is necessary and can be easily determined from the minimum cost tree. The results of the Samuelson and Nöldeke-Samuelson analyses are most easily rederived by showing that their lemmas follow from a modified coradius computation.
non-ergodic (as in Anderlini and Ianni (1996) and some of Nöldeke and Samuelson's (1997) signaling games), and papers which employ variants of the solution concept (as in Binmore and Samuelson (1997) who look at an g i h k j limit). While it is easy to construct examples of Markov processes for which the radius-modified coradius calculation lacks power (as was done at the end of Section 4), such examples appear to be quite rare in the literature -the only examples I know of are a few of the differentiated price oligopoly games discussed in Kandori and Rob (1995) .
To help assess whether the techniques of this paper may also facilitate the analysis of more complex models, it is useful also to discuss "applicability" in terms of where the techniques of this paper make the analysis easier. The cleanest examples I've found of this type are, not coincidentally, those that I have discussed in this paper. The result on l m -dominance with its trivial proof generalizes several previous results including KMR's original theorem on n p o q games, Kandori and Rob's (1995) result that pareto optimal equilibria are selected in pure coordination games, and conclusion that risk dominance is a sufficient condition for being long run stochastically stable in games satisfying their total bandwagon and monotone share properties. 22 Similarly, the result on one dimensional local interaction models generalizes the analysis of r s u t games in Ellison (1993) . 
Relationships with other papers
The analysis of this paper combines and builds on several ideas which have been developed in previous papers. The single most basic idea behind the main theorem of this paper -that long run stochastic stability is closely related to waiting times necessary for transitions between limit sets -is new as a basis for an algorithm, but has been clearly recognized as an intuitive description of long run stochastic stability from the very beginning (see e.g. KMR).
While the focus on waiting times rather than trees is new, the basic intuitions behind the calculations -that evolution with noise tends to favor limit sets with larger basins of attraction, and that the presence of intermediate steady states may facilitate evolution -each have predecessors 22 The result also generalizes the result of Maruta (1997) (which was developed later, but without knowledge of this paper) that v w -dominant equilibria are selected in coordination games. 23 Here it is instructive also to compare the tree surgery proof in Ellison (1993) with the fully constructive proof which was given in the working paper version of that paper only for 2-neighbor interaction.
in the literature. That a set with a large enough basin of attraction is selected has been noted in a number of places. An explicit statement of the fact that x z y{ 7 | w } 9 s z 7
is a sufficient condition for long run stochastic stability was independently given by Evans (1993) (see Lemma 3.1), with a tree surgery argument which establishes the result (though it is not stated explicitly) contained in the proof of Theorem 1 of Ellison (1993) . Other authors have noted that the limit set with the largest basin of attaction is the long run stochastically stable set in particular contexts, e.g. note that this is the case in '
games satisfying their total bandwagon and monotone share properties. That the presence of intermediate steady states may speed evolution has not been stated so explicitly, but clearly plays a prominent role in the work of Samuelson (1994) and Samuelson (1993, 1997) . In those papers, the long run stochastically stable set is identified using a lemma which (in my words) states that a component of limit sets receives probability one in the limit distribution if z ' z and can be reached from any other limit set via a chain of single mutations (a condition which ensures that s s 7
.)
This paper adds to this lemma the idea that a path deserves "credit" for z mutations (rather than one) when passing through the limit set and combines it with the previous one so that it can be applied in models where the nonselected limit sets are not so unstable as to be upset by just a single mutation.
The final departure of this paper from the literature is its provision of a general description of medium run behavior in the form of a characterization of waiting times. While no previous papers have provided any general discussions of medium run behavior, the topic has been discussed in a few particular models. Ellison (1993) argues that convergence rates are an important consideration and discusses convergence rates both via an eigenvalue computation and in terms of ¡ £ ¢ asymptotics of waiting times. The two subsequent papers which explicitly discuss convergence rates, those of Binmore and Samuelson (1997) and Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) , both take the approach of using minimum ¤ -period transition probabilities to bound waiting times. Though neither paper states a theorem at a level of generality which is greater than that necessary to apply to the model in question, the arguments they give are easily generalized to establish that the waiting time to reach a long run stochastically stable state
A Freidlin-Wentzell 'tree surgery' argument
While I have presented the radius-modified coradius theorem as exploiting insights gained from thinking about waiting times, for those familiar with the previous literature it may also be useful to note that a result similar to the long run stochastic stability part of the theorem can also be derived using a "tree surgery" argument. The proof is not too involved, and thus might be used as a starting point when trying to analyze models to which the theorem of this paper fails to apply. 
It should be noted that unlike Theorems 1 and 2, the ö in the statement of this proposition is required to be a single limit set rather than a union of limit sets. When , the cost of each of the transitions in such a path appears as a term in the second sum on the right hand side. Further, the terms are distinct for distinct limit sets.
Hence, that sum is at least
Ö××
is a lower cost Ø -tree as desired.
As for the second conclusion of the theorem, note simply that if
, then the argument above shows that the minimum cost å -tree is no cheaper than than a ae -tree for some ç è ê é .
QED.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have discussed the behavior of stochastic models both in general and in several particular examples. With regard to the former, the paper outlines an approach which involves describing the basins of attraction with two new measures, the radius and coradius. The main theorem is applicable to many of the models which have been previously studied and expands our understanding of these models in two ways: it provides a clear intuitive argument which may eliminate much of the mystery left in the wake of Freidlin-Wentzell tree constructions and provides a measure of the rate at which a model converges. The approach is tractable in the examples discussed here despite the fact that the games involved may have best response cycles, and that in one case (the two-dimensional local interaction model) the dynamics are so complex as to render even a listing of the stable limit sets difficult. As the literature on stochastic evolution continues to grow, economic interest continues to draw researchers to more complex games. Among the recent notable examples are Young's (1993b) analysis of bargaining, Nöldeke and Samuelson's (1997) analysis of signaling games, and Binmore and Samuelson's (1997) "muddling" model. I
hope that the argument of this paper will spur further research into such topics in the future both by reducing the burden of carrying out proofs and by making analyses more complete and more transparent.
This paper is also a paper about models of evolution with noise. In this area, the primary result of the paper is that the selection of risk dominant equilibria in ë í ì x î games generalizes to the selection of ï ð -dominant equilibria whenever they exist. Other examples illustrate that the long run stochastically stable outcome need not involve Nash equilibrium play, even when the Nash equilibrium of a game is unique, and that despite lacking contagion dynamics, models with two dimensional local interaction can feature rapid convergence.
The paper may be of more general interest for the insight it provides into the circumstances in which evolutionary change is likely to be rapid. The argument that shifts from one equilibrium to another are most likely to be observed in systems which are amenable to gradual change may be applicable in a wide variety of economic contexts -both where gradual change takes the form of shifts which occur first in small subsets of the population and where it involves a continuous variable adjusting slowly between two extremes.
In the future, the results of this paper might be extended in a number of directions. Among the most promising topics to explore are the possibility of extending the applicability of the theorem by grouping limit sets, the possibility of developing tighter bounds on waiting times by taking advantage of specific features of the dynamics rather than always assuming the worst case, and the use of tree surgery arguments in situations where the main theorem of this paper does not apply. . We may choose this path so that the limit sets through which it passes are distinct and so that the path is contained in each of these limit sets for a set of successive periods. (Given any path from to one can always obtain a path of equal or lower modified cost by replacing segments between the first and last visits to each limit set and between the first and last period in each limit set by paths which remain within the limit set in question and have zero cost.) 
